CIA activities in the Americas

 

Contents   1 Domestic activities 1.1 USA 1950 1.2 USA 1951 1.2.1 Operation Mockingbird 1.2.1.1 Forerunner of Domestic Contact Service/OSINT 1.2.2 Office of Current Intelligence 1.2.3 National Student Association 1.2.4 General program of involvement in U.S. anti-communist front organizations 1.3 USA 1952 1.4 USA 1952-1975 1.5 USA 1973 1.6 USA 1997 2 Canada 2.1 Canada 1999 2.1.1 Counterintelligence 3 Mexico 3.1 Mexico 2005 4 Latin America 4.1 Regional 4.1.1 2005 4.2 Caribbean 4.2.1 Cuba 4.2.1.1 Cuba 1959 4.2.1.2 Cuba 1960 4.2.1.3 Cuba 1961 4.2.1.4 Cuba 1962 4.2.1.5 Cuba 1963 4.2.1.6 Cuba 1965 4.2.1.7 Cuba 1967 4.2.1.8 Cuba 1976 4.2.1.9 Cuba 2005 4.2.1.9.1 Intelligence analysis

4.2.2 Dominican Republic 4.2.2.1 Dominican Republic 1961 4.2.2.2 Dominican Republic 1967 4.2.3 Haiti 4.2.3.1 Haiti 1963 4.2.3.2 Haiti 2005 4.2.3.2.1 Intelligence analysis 5 Central America 5.1 Guatemala 5.1.1 Guatemala 1952 5.1.2 Guatemala 1953 5.1.3 Guatemala 1954 5.1.4 Guatemala 1965 5.1.5 Guatemala 1967 5.1.6 Guatemala 1993 5.1.7 Guatemala 2007 5.2 Guyana 5.2.1 Guyana 1966 5.2.2 Guyana 1967 5.3 Honduras 5.3.1 Honduras 1984 5.3.2 Honduras 1987 5.3.3 Honduras 1995 5.4 Nicaragua 5.4.1 Nicaragua 1981-1990 5.4.2 Nicaragua 1985 5.4.3 Nicaragua 1987 5.4.4 Nicaragua 1989 6 South America 6.1 Regional issues 6.1.1 1980 6.1.2 1992 6.2 National issues 6.2.1 Argentina 6.2.1.1 Argentina 1965 6.2.1.2 Argentina 1975 6.2.1.3 Argentina 1976

6.2.1.4 Argentina 1977 6.2.1.5 Argentina 1978 6.2.1.6 Argentina 1979 6.2.1.7 Argentina 1981 6.2.1.8 Argentina 1983 6.2.1.9 Argentina 1987 6.2.1.10 Argentina 1989 6.2.1.11 Argentina, date uncertain 6.2.1.12 Argentina 1992 6.2.2 Bolivia 6.2.2.1 Bolivia 1964 6.2.2.2 Bolivia 1965 6.2.2.3 Bolivia 1967 6.2.3 Brazil 6.2.3.1 Brazil 1965 6.2.4 Chile 6.2.4.1 Chile 1964 6.2.4.2 Chile 1970 6.2.4.3 Chile 1973 6.2.5 Colombia 6.2.5.1 Colombia 1991 6.2.5.2 Colombia 1999 6.2.5.3 Colombia 2002 6.2.5.4 Colombia 2005 6.2.5.4.1 Intelligence analysis 6.2.5.5 Colombia 2007 6.2.6 Ecuador 6.2.7 Peru 6.2.7.1 Peru 1963 6.2.7.2 Peru 1997 6.2.7.3 Peru 1998 6.2.7.4 Peru 1999 6.2.7.5 Peru 2000 6.2.7.6 Peru 2004 6.2.8 Venezuela 6.2.8.1 Venezuela 2002 6.2.8.2 Venezuela 2005 6.2.8.3 Venezuela 2007 7 References

Domestic activities

USA 1950
The CIA organized the Pacific Corporation, the first of many CIA private enterprises.
Director Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter approved Project BLUEBIRD, later renamed Project ARTICHOKE, which was the CIA's first mind control program. The CIA ran a mind-control research program code-named Project MKULTRA in the United States and Canada. The project in Montreal included developing techniques used by Nazi scientists to wipe out the existing personalities of the victims. Controversial issues surrounding Project MKULTRA involved the mysterious death of Dr.Frank Olson, a scientist at Fort Detrick, Maryland where many of these studies were conducted.The CIA claimed that Frank Olson had committed suicide but an autopsy on Olson suggested murder. The grand jury inquiry was approved on April 27,1996 and on the same day former CIA chief William disappeared and his remains were found in a lake.

USA 1951

Operation Mockingbird
Under Frank Wisner and the Office of Policy Coordination, Operation Mockingbird was set up to put anticommunist messages into US news media. Wisner recruited Philip Graham, publisher of the Washington Post, to run the news aspects of the operation. Columbia Broadcasting System began co-operating with the CIA. "To understand the role of most journalist‑operatives, it is necessary to dismiss some myths about undercover work for American intelligence services. Few American agents are “spies” in the popularly accepted sense of the term. “Spying” — the acquisition of secrets from a foreign government—is almost always done by foreign nationals who have been recruited by the CIA and are under CIA control in their own countries. Thus the primary role of an American working undercover abroad is often to aid in the recruitment and “handling” of foreign nationals who are channels of secret information reaching American intelligence.
"Many journalists were used by the CIA to assist in this process and they had the reputation of being among the best in the business. The peculiar nature of the job of the foreign correspondent is ideal for such work: he is accorded unusual access by his host country, permitted to travel in areas often off‑limits to other Americans, spends much of his time cultivating sources in governments, academic institutions, the military establishment and the scientific communities. He has the opportunity to form long‑term personal relationships with sources and—perhaps more than any other category of American operative—is in a position to make correct judgments about the susceptibility and availability of foreign nationals for recruitment as spies." Formal recruitment of reporters was generally handled at high levels—after the journalist had undergone a thorough background check. The actual approach might even be made by a deputy director or division chief. On some occasions, no discussion would he entered into until the journalist had signed a pledge of secrecy.
“The secrecy agreement was the sort of ritual that got you into the tabernacle,” said a former assistant to the Director of Central Intelligence. “After that you had to play by the rules.” David Attlee Phillips, former Western Hemisphere chief of clandestine services and a former journalist himself, estimated in an interview that at least 200 journalists signed secrecy agreements or employment contracts with the Agency in the past twenty‑five years. Phillips, who owned a small English‑language newspaper in Santiago, Chile, when he was recruited by the CIA in 1950, described the approach: “Somebody from the Agency says, ‘I want you to help me. 1 know you are a true‑blue American, but I want you to sign a piece of paper before I tell you what it’s about.’ I didn’t hesitate to sign, and a lot of newsmen didn’t hesitate over the next twenty years.”

Forerunner of Domestic Contact Service/OSINT
This function, run by the Domestic Contact Service(also called the Domestic Contact Division) of the CIA, was legal, as it did not violate the CIA prohibitions of police power or spying on Americans. It was a voluntary debriefing of Americans with useful information. It is now considered part of Open Source Intelligence OSINT.

Office of Current Intelligence
President Truman created the Office of Current Intelligence which was directed by Huntington D. Sheldon. This was a renamed and extended version of the WWII section of the OSS that gave White House and other high-level briefings.

National Student Association
From 1951 to 1962, CIA pays the National Student Association to spy on campus, both by funding the staff positions of the organization, and by enticing or coercing individual students to act as informants.

General program of involvement in U.S. anti-communist front organizations
A new book by author Hugh Wilford gives a history of CIA involvement in U.S. anti-communist front organizations during the 1950s.

USA 1952
The Robertson Panel was a committee commissioned by CIA in 1952 in response to widespread Unidentified Flying Object reports, especially in the Washington D.C. area. The panel was briefed on U.S. military activities and intelligence; hence the report was originally classified Secret. See the more recent article Arthur C. Lundahl Unidentified Flying Objects, which addresses discussions in 1967.                                                         USA 1952-1975
A number of projects, some run by NSA and some by CIA, intercepted mail and electronic communications of US citizens in the US. These programs were, by 1975, discontinued as illegal without warrants. Various interception programs under the George W. Bush administration have been restarted, although the Administration has not explained them, and claims no warrants are needed under the doctrine of unitary authority.
CIA, and the rest of the intelligence community, receives product from thousands of NSA SIGINT programs. During this same period, CIA received extensive SIGINT on Southeast Asia and the Soviet bloc, and the rest of the world, and used this in preparing analytical products. Among these, for example, are nearly 200 National Intelligence Estimates on Southeast Asia, plus monthly summaries for Vietnam and specific studies relevant to military operations.
Among these were Project SHAMROCK and Project MINARET surveillance data on Americans, judged inappropriate by the Director of NSA and shut down by 1975. Much to the surprise of some, not everything CIA received from NSA involved impropriety.
Another program, HTLINGUAL intercepted physical mail, first simply recording the source and destintion addresses on the envelope, and later surreptitiously opening and reading mail. This ran from 1952 to 1973.    USA 1973
"After Colby left the Agency on January 28, 1976, and was succeeded by George Bush, the CIA announced a new policy: “Effective immediately, the CIA will not enter into any paid or contractual relationship with any full‑time or part‑time news correspondent accredited by any U.S. news service, newspaper, periodical, radio or television network or station” At the time of the announcement, the Agency acknowledged that the policy would result in termination of less than half of the relationships with the 50 U.S. journalists it said were still affiliated with the Agency. The text of the announcement noted that the CIA would continue to “welcome” the voluntary, unpaid cooperation of journalists. Thus, many relationships were permitted to remain intact."
USA 1997
Notre Dame law professor G. Robert Blakey, counsel for the House Select Committee on Assassinations, states that the CIA withheld information from the Warren Commission and the Congressional Committee he represented. According to a 1997 New York Times article, the CIA conducted a covert propaganda campaign to squelch criticism of the Warren Report. The CIA urged its field stations to use their "propaganda assets" to attack those who didn't agree with the Warren Report. In a dispatch from CIA headquarters, the Agency instructed its stations around the world to:

1. counteract the "new wave of books and articles criticizing the [Warren] Commission's findings...[and] conspiracy theories ...[that] have frequently thrown suspicion on our organization";
2. "discuss the publicity problem with liaison and friendly elite contacts, especially politicians and editors;" and
3. "employ propaganda assets to answer and refute the attacks of the critics. ... Book reviews and feature articles are particularly appropriate for this purpose. ... The aim of this dispatch is to provide material for countering and discrediting the claims of the conspiracy theorists..." In 1997 the CIA came forward to admit its historical interest in UFOs.

Canada

Canada 1999

Counterintelligence
An indication of the United States' close operational cooperation is the creation of a new message distribution label within the main US military communications network. Previously, the marking of NOFORN (i.e., NO FOREIGN NATIONALS) required the originator to specify which, if any, non-US countries could receive the information. A new handling caveat, USA/AUS/CAN/GBR/NZL EYES ONLY, used primarily on intelligence messages, gives an easier way to indicate that the material can be shared with Australia, Canada, Great Britain, and New Zealand.

Mexico

Mexico 2005
In Porter Goss' statement to the Senate Intelligence Committee, he said "campaigning for the 2006 presidential election in Mexico is likely to stall progress on fiscal, labor, and energy reforms."
Latin America
During World War II, the Federal Bureau of Investigation had been the primary US intelligence agency for Latin America, with some involvement with the Office of Strategic Services, the predecessor of CIA. After the war, the CIA developed strong operations in Latin America.

Regional

2005
Porter Goss, in his early 2005 summary to the Select Intelligence Committee, mentioned there will be numerous elections in 2006, in Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, and Venezuela. He suggested that Colombia, Cuba, Haiti, Mexico and Venezuela present particular concerns in this election.

Caribbean
See Radio Swan for a Caribbean radio station generally associated with the US and Honduras, and, during the Bay of Pigs operation, apparently to assist with covert communications. After the invasion failed, however, it changed to a generally anti-Castro, but not inciting to revolution, station until 1968.
In 1962, a Special National Intelligence Estimate addressed "The threat to US security interests in the Caribbean area. Potential threats were seen as "Threats to US interests could arise from a variety of sources: the vulnerability of the area to attack from outside the hemisphere; the establishment of a military presence within the area by hostile powers; attempts by the Communist powers, with the help of the present Cuban Government, to spread Communist revolution to other parts of the area by military action or subversion; the growth of indigenous radical nationalism; and instability rising from attempts by governments in the area to interfere in the affairs of their neighbors or to impose their will upon them." It foreshadowed the potential of the Cuban Missile Crisis with the general assessment "the USSR can and probably will augment its naval, air, and communications capabilities in the area by the development of arrangements or facilities not openly identifiable as Soviet military bases. For example, the improvement of Cuban naval and air installations would provide facilities suitable for Soviet use, and special installations and arrangements could be set up for intelligence collection or subversive purposes."

Cuba
After its revolution, Cuba sent forces to Africa and South America, in support of rebel forces.
Cuba 1959
On 11 December 1959, CIA recommends assassinate Fidel Castro.                                                                     Cuba 1960
Operation Mongoose was approved by U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower to assassinate Fidel Castro.
The Soviet Ambassador to the US said the USSR had no plans to put bases into Cuba.
There had been CIA agent reports and NSA SIGINT of increased military activity in Cuba starting in late 1960, but these initially appeared to be of defensive equipment.
Cuba 1961
Between August 1960, and April 1961, the CIA pursued a series of plots to poison or shoot Castro according to the assassination plots proposed by Colonel Sheffield Edwards, director of the CIA's Office of Security. The CIA-organized Bay of Pigs Invasion of Cuba in 1961, failed, using plans that the regular military advised against. Kennedy also required the invasion to be less visible, and reduced its air support. Recently declassified documents show that President Kennedy had officially denied the CIA authorization to invade Cuba. Cuban leader Fidel Castro used the routed invasion to consolidate his power and strengthen Cuba's ties with the Soviet Union.
CIA establishes a main physical facility in Miami, Florida, as one of the bases for intelligence and covert actions against Cuba. The station itself had the cryptonym JMWAVE; operations using it had their own cryptonyms or code words, such as Operation Mongoose. The facility, under commercial cover of "Zenith Technical Enterprises", was located at the University of Miami, was considered too obvious and closed in 1968. Some of its functions moved to other locations in the Miami area, including the overt radio broadcast monitoring station of the Foreign Broadcast Information Service.
Operation Mongoose was re-approved to Edward Lansdale by U.S. President John F. Kennedy in November 1961. The CIA tried and failed several times to assassinate Fidel Castro. Various methods are discussed, such as hiding bombs in seashells. The limitations of large scale covert action became apparent during the CIA-organized Bay of Pigs Invasion of Cuba in 1961. The failed para-military invasion embarrassed the CIA and the United States world-wide. Recently de-classified documents show in written confirmation that President Kennedy had officially denied the CIA authorization to invade Cuba Cuban leader Fidel Castro used the routed invasion to consolidate his power and strengthen Cuba's ties with the Soviet Union.
The CIA supported a variety of anti-Castro agents such as Orlando Bosch and Luis Posada Carriles, who are wanted in Venezuela for terrorism charges.                                                                                                         Cuba 1962
The January 1962 Special National Intelligence Estimate suggested "We believe that Castro's Cuba will continue to do what it can to export its revolution." Such attempts were made, especially under the leadership of Che Guevara.
While there were CIA agent reports of increased Soviet activity from late 1960 on, NSA SIGINT gave indications of increased air defense activity from approximately May 1962. In August, CIA imagery intelligence IMINT confirmed the presence of Soviet SA-2 surface-to-air missiles, the presence of which indicated something was receiving exceptional protection. Surveillance, without overflights, was stepped up. In October 1962, high-altitude reconnaissance photographs, taken from outside Cuban airspace by U-2 aircraft flown by Air Force pilots were analyzed at the CIA's National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC), indicated that Soviet missile construction was underway. As described by Dino Brugioni, these photographs were brought to the President and Secretary of Defense, who authorized overflights that confirmed the construction and triggered the Cuban Missile Crisis.
NPIC IMINT was key in assessing the activity in the crisis. A selection of the actual photographs, as well as supporting data such as the chart of CIA photographs are at the George Washington University National Security Archive. Some of the techniques used to determine what was being shipped into Cuba, and out of it after the US-USSR agreement was reached, was called "crateology", or recognizing the characteristic ways in which the Soviets crated military equipment, is Hilsman's To Move a Nation. A photograph analyzed using the crateology technique is shown in.                                                                                                                         Cuba 1963
November 1963, Operation Mongoose was cancelled following the John F. Kennedy assassination.            Cuba 1965
In a letter read by Fidel Castro, on Che Guevara bids a "Farewell", resigns from all of his official positions within the Cuban government. The letter, which Che apparently never intended to be made public, states that "I have fulfilled the part of my duty that tied me to the Cuban revolution...and I say goodbye to you, to the comrades, to your people, who are now mine." (CIA Intelligence Memorandum, "Castro and Communism: The Cuban Revolution in Perspective," 5/9/66).                                                                                                    Cuba 1967
An agreement of April 28 between the US Army Military Group in Bolivia, and the Bolivian military, assigned mission sixteen-member United States Army Special Forces, drawn from the 8th Special Forces group of the U.S. Army Forces at Southcom in Panama, to "produce a rapid reaction force capable of counterinsurgency operations and skilled to the degree that four months of intensive training can be absorbed by the personnel presented by the Bolivian Armed Forces." In October, the 2nd Battalion, aided by U.S. military and CIA personnel, did engage and capture Che Guevara's small band of rebels. Written in October, a CIA Directorate of Intelligence report presents an assessment that Guevara's preeminence as a leader of the Cuban revolution has waned, and his internal and international policies have been abandoned. In domestic policy, his economic strategy of rapid industrialization has "brought the economy to its lowest point since Castro came to power," and observes that Guevara believed centralized economic planning was an ideological necessity.
In foreign policy, he "never wavered from his firm revolutionary stand, even as other Cuban leaders began to devote most of their attention to the internal problems of the revolution." Guevara also preferred, in opposition to Castro, the Chinese side of the Sino-Soviet split.
With Guevara no longer in Cuba, the CIA's assessment concludes, "there is no doubt that Castro's more cautious position on exporting revolution, as well as his different economic approach, led to Che's downfall." Che Guevara is captured and executed by Bolivian Army Rangers. The CIA officer with the team tried to follow US government wishes and take him alive to Panama, but failed.                                                                        Cuba 1976
On May 17, 2005, documents from the National Security Archives were presented on ABC's television show "Nightline". Among other things, they discussed Luis Posada Carriles, who was detained in Miami in May 2005 by Homeland Security. Posada is a Venezuelan living in the US, who is a member of anti-Castro groups, and is charged with plotting to blow up a Cubana airliner in 1976. Venezuela, from where the airliner flew, has charged him with terrorism against the aircraft. The Posada matter points out the inherent conflict between US anti-terrorism and its policy of hostility to Cuba. "He has admitted to plotting attacks that damaged tourist spots in Havana and killed an Italian visitor there in 1997. He was convicted in Panama in a 2000 bomb plot against Mr. Castro." Posada, who was a Venezuelan intelligence officer, claims asylum in the US, although Venezuela (not Cuba) is trying to extradite him. "If Mr. Posada has indeed illegally entered the United States, the Bush administration has three choices: granting him asylum; jailing him for illegal entry; or granting Venezuela's request for extradition.
It is unclear if Posada, or his associate Orlando Bosch, notified the CIA or FBI before the airliner attack. "According to Peter Kornbluh, who directs the Archive's Cuba Documentation Project, Posada's presence in the United States "poses a direct challenge to the Bush administration's terrorism policy. The declassified record," he said, "leaves no doubt that Posada has been one of the world's most unremitting purveyors of terrorist violence." President Bush has repeatedly stated that no nation should harbor terrorists, and all nations should work to bring individuals who advocate and employ the use of terror tactics to justice. During the Presidential campaign last year Bush stated that "I think you can create conditions so that those who use terror as a tool are less acceptable in parts of the world." Although Posada has reportedly been in the Miami area for more than six weeks, the FBI has indicated it is not actively searching for him.
Cuba 2005

Intelligence analysis
Porter Goss indicated Agency concern with the succession, given that Fidel Castro was suffering the effects of a serious fall.

Dominican Republic

Dominican Republic 1961
There was CIA involvement in the assassination of the President of the Dominican Republic, Rafael Trujillo, but declassified reports conflict about the extent. In a report to the deputy attorney general, CIA officials described the agency as having "no active part" in the assassination and only a "faint connection" with the groups that planned the killing. However, an internal CIA memorandum states that an Office of Inspector General investigation into Trujillo's murder disclosed "quite extensive Agency involvement with the plotters."
Dominican Republic 1967
A report to President Lyndon B. Johnson refers to the guerilla problem being dormant in the Dominican Republic, and US training being provided there. Cause and effect were not analyzed. "There are no active guerrillas although there are indications that the Communist MPD and 14th of June Movement would like to open a front. The Dominican armed forces are keeping a close watch on their activities. Balaguer has given strong support to our efforts to help him develop special anti-guerrilla units. In recent months Dominican authorities have obtained documents from Cuban-trained agents showing that Cuba is furnishing money and training for guerrilla activities." A little later, Rostow referred to a problem with one of the Dominican officials. "With the full cooperation of Balaguer and the armed forces, we have made good progress in our internal security programs. No additional measures by us are necessary. It would help if Balaguer got rid of his thuggish Chief of Police. Covey Oliver will ask John Crimmins to make the pitch."

Haiti

Haiti 1963
In a White House meeting, DCI McCone suggested that this looked like the Cuban policy in July 1959 which gave the Soviets an opening into Cuba, and suggested the US have a complete diplomatic relationship that was visibly informal. The President agreed, ordered Ambassador Thurston recalled, and reserved the decision as to whether he should be returned or another Ambassador returned.
The aid program apparently involves only $3 million or $4 million for airport construction in Haiti, the administration of which is in the hands of Pan American.
"CIA was asked to explore the exile group possibilities and to determine what action, if any, should be taken." The DCI said "most insurgents were political has-beens or influential Haitians who desire to regain property that has been lost through expropriation or otherwise."
Haiti 2005

Intelligence analysis
According to Porter Goss' testimony to the Senate Intelligence Committee, "the outlook is very cloudy for legitimate, timely elections in November 2005 in Haiti--even with substantial international support."
Central America

Guatemala
Several hundred records were released by the CIA on May 23, 1997 on its involvement in the 1954 coup in Guatemala. They reflected Truman Administration feeling on the government of Arbenz government, elected in 1950, would continue a process of socio- economic reforms that the CIA disdainfully refers to in its memoranda as "an intensely nationalistic program of progress colored by the touchy, anti-foreign inferiority complex of the 'Banana Republic.'"
Between 1954 and 1990, human rights groups estimate, the repressive operatives of successive military regimes "murdered more than 100,000 civilians. "Although most high-level US officials recognized that a hostile government in Guatemala by itself did not constitute a direct security threat to the United States, they viewed events there in the context of the growing Cold War struggle with the Soviet Union and feared Guatemala could become a client state from which the Soviets could project power and influence throughout the Western Hemisphere.
CIA and IC reports tended to support the view that Guatemala and the Arbenz regime were rapidly falling under the sway of communism. DCI Walter Bedell Smith…believed the situation called for action. Their assessment was that without help, the Guatemalan opposition would remain inept, disorganized and efficient. The anti-Communist elements -- the Catholic hierarchy, landowners, business interests, the railway workers union, university students and the Army were prepared to prevent a Communist accession to power, but they had little outside support.
Other US officials, especially in the Department of State, urged a more cautious approach. The Bureau of Inter-American Affairs,for example, did not want to present "the spectacle of the elephant shaking with alarm before the mouse." It wanted a policy of firm persuasion with the withholding of virtually all cooperative assistance, and the concluding of military defense assistance pacts, with El Salvador, Nicaragua and Honduras. Although the Department of State position became the official public US policy, the CIA assessment…had support within the Truman administration as well.
Guatemala 1952
The first CIA effort to overthrow the Guatemalan president--a CIA collaboration with Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza to support a disgruntled general named Carlos Castillo Armas and codenamed Operation PBFORTUNE--was authorized by President Truman in 1952. As early as February of that year, CIA Headquarters began generating memos with subject titles such as "Guatemalan Communist Personnel to be disposed of during Military Operations," outlining categories of persons to be neutralized "through Executive Action"--murder--or through imprisonment and exile. Following a visit by Washington by Nicaraguan President Anastasio Somoza in April 1952, in which Somoza boasted that if provided arms, he and Guatemalan exile Carlos Castillo Armas could overthrow Arbenz, President Harry Truman asked DCI Smith to investigate the possibility…" After seeing the report of an agent sent to investigate, Smith approved a proposal to supply Castillo Armas with arms and $225,000 and that Nicaragua and Honduras provide air cover. PBFORTUNE was approved on 9 September 1952, but was terminated a month later when Smith learned it had become known. The general idea of assassinations were mentioned, but only at a general level.
Guatemala 1953
In 1953, the CIA continued to try to influence Guatemalan policy and explore disposing of key adversaries…As psychological warfare, the CIA Guatemala City station sent "death notice" cards to all leading communists. The one-month campaigns in April and June produced no apparent results. The National Security Council and President Eisenhower approved a covert action against Arbenz in August 1953. Ot carried a $2.7 million budget for "psychological warfare and political action" and "subversion," among the other components of a small paramilitary war.                                                                                                                                          Guatemala 1954
PBSUCCESS, authorized by President Dwight D. Eisenhower, was the codename for the CIA first covert operation in Latin America, carried out in Guatemala. The purpose of the operation was to overthrow Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán, the democratically-elected President of Guatemala. The U.S. began to worry about the growth of Communism there due Jacobo Arbenz's policies. By recruiting a Guatemalan military force the CIA's operation succeeded in eliminating the democratic government and replacing it with a military junta headed by Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas.
Contrary to popular belief the responsibility of the United Fruit Company in instigating the coup d'etat was relatively small; it is not mentioned in the declassified CIA history. A U.S. State Department report released in 2003 states that social unrest within Guatemala and Arbenz's alleged Communist ties were the reason the CIA first drew up a contingency plan to oust Arbenz, entitled Operation PBFORTUNE The plan was drafted in 1951, before the U.S.-based United Fruit Company's landholdings had been expropriated.
The CIA's own declassified analysis is generally consistent, although differing in detail with the above. Training for the new PBSUCCESS plan included preparation of a briefing plan for assassinations,separate from the NSC plan.
Dissident leaders urged the "violent disposal" of an opponent, as psychological warfare, but the CIA chief of the temporary covert action base, LINCOLN, cautioned that they only wanted to destroy effectiveness; "we do not mean to kill the man…scare not kill."
Castillo Armas' CIA-supported force entered Guatemala on June 16. Arbenz sought asylum on 27 June, and 120 other Arbenz officials were given safe passage out of the country. There is no evidence of executions. "Discussion of whether to assassinate Guatemalans…took place in a historical era quite different from the present. In the documents, however, was an unsigned, undated technical discussion of assassination. Soviet Communism had earned a reputation of using whatever means were expedient to advance Moscow's interests internationally…American officials and the public regarded foreign Communist parties as Soviet pawns and as threatening to US security interest. The public perception was that the Soviets were intent on world hegemony -- which the Soviets believed of the US.
The political and consequent social instability created in Guatemala 6 years later resulted in a very long civil war and its consequent, destructive impact upon the society, the economy, human rights and the culture of Guatemala. According to author Kate Doyle, the CIA-sponsored military coup in 1954 was “the poison arrow that pierced the heart of Guatemala's young democracy.”                                                                                   Guatemala 1965
President Lyndon B. Johnson wanted to invade Guatemala with private military contractors. In support of this, CIA Director William Raborn was tasked with finding evidence to support the President's belief that Guatemala was a Cuban puppet state. Raborn was unsuccessful in finding such evidence.                                Guatemala 1967
CIA begins to train police and military of Guatemala.
Guatemala 1993
In 1993 the CIA helped in overthrowing Jorge Serrano Elías who attempted a self-coup and had suspended the constitution, dissolved Congress and the Supreme Court, and imposed censorship. He was replaced by Ramiro de León Carpio.
Guatemala 2007
Guatemala elects Alvaro Colom, its first leftist president in 50 years, the last one having been overthrown in a CIA-arranged coup in 1954.

Guyana

Guyana 1966
In an NIE focused on the short term, the major conclusions were:
"British Guiana will probably make a relatively smooth transition to independence, but racial suspicions between East Indians and Negroes will continue to dominate Guyanese politics.
If "these tensions break out again into violence will depend in large measure on the conduct of Prime Minister Forbes Burnham, leader of the Negro party (the PNC), and of Cheddi Jagan, leader of the East Indian party (the PPP)." Burnham's moderate government has kept Jagan's side in control. "...new elections are due by late 1968, and between now and then tensions will rise and may at some point get out of hand.
"Even after British troops depart in October 1966, Guyanese security forces can probably cope with sporadic violence. If violence got out of control, Burnham would probably call for a return of British troops. If US consent were forthcoming and British troops were available, we believe that London would comply.
"The governing coalition of Burnham, a professed but pragmatic socialist, and the conservative United Force leader, Peter D’Aguiar, will continue to be a tenuous one. Friction between the partners over patronage and fiscal issues will probably be intensified after independence, but chances are that a common fear of Jagan will hold the coalition together.
"Guyana’s economy will need substantial foreign capital, much of it from the US. The need for aid will keep Burnham on tolerable terms with the US, UK, and Canada, though his administration will incline toward a neutralist posture in foreign affairs. If Jagan came to power, he could, because of his Marxist sympathies and his connections in Communist countries, count on some help from these countries. However, they probably would furnish only token quantities of aid. 421. /1/                                                                                              Guyana 1967
A covert action was proposed to the 303 Committee: "It is established U.S. Government policy that Cheddi Jagan, East Indian Marxist leader of the pro-Communist People’s Progressive Party (PPP) in Guyana, will not be permitted to take over the government of an independent Guyana. Jagan has the electoral support of the East Indians, who are approximately 50% of the total population of Guyana. It is believed that Jagan has a good chance of coming to power in the next elections unless steps are taken to prevent this. Prime Minister Forbes Burnham, leader of the majority People’s National Congress (PNC) in the coalition, is aware of the problem, and has stated that he is fully prepared to utilize the electoral machinery at his disposal to ensure his own re-election. Burnham has initiated steps for electoral registration of Guyanese at home and abroad,In a meeting on September 16, 1966, Burnham requested money for various political purposes and outlined his plans to issue identification cards to all Guyanans above the age of 10, and to identify and register all Guyanans of African ancestry in the United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States in order to get their absentee votes in the next elections. "Conversely, Burnham acknowledged with a smile, East Indians living abroad may have trouble getting registered and, if registered, getting ballots." and has requested financial assistance for the PNC campaign. It is recommended that he and his party be provided with covert support in order to assure his victory at the polls. At the same time, it is believed that support to Peter D’Aguiar and his United Force (UF), the minority party in the coalition government, is also essential in order to offset Jagan’s solidly entrenched East Indian electoral support. It is recommended that the 303 Committee approve the courses of action outlined in this paper at a cost of According to an April 10 memorandum for the record, 'the 303 Committee approved this proposal at its April 7 meeting. emphasized during the Committee’s discussion the importance of starting early in the implementation of the proposal.
"Problem: To prevent the election of Cheddi Jagan in the next elections in Guyana.
"Under the Guyana Constitution, new elections for the National Assembly must take place prior to 31 March 1969, and can take place at any time should the Prime Minister bring about the dissolution of the Parliament. Prime Minister Forbes Burnham of Guyana is aware that the U.S. Government is opposed to Cheddi Jagan’s assumption of power in Guyana. He is also acutely conscious of the racial factors in the country which work to Jagan’s advantage, and he realizes that he must immediately initiate a vigorous campaign if he is to defeat Jagan.
He "has personally undertaken the task of reorganizing the PNC, which has not functioned in many areas since the last elections. He plans to establish campaign headquarters in Georgetown and other urban areas where the African vote is concentrated, and will also send organizers throughout Guyana to re-enlist PNC supporters who have been inactive in party affairs since the last elections. At the same time, Burnham is sending a trusted political adviser abroad to survey the potential absentee vote which he can expect from Guyanese residing in the U.S., the U.K., Canada and the West Indies.
"Burnham believes that he would have great difficulty ensuring his own re-election without support from the U.S. Government. He has requested financial support for staff and campaign expenses, motor vehicles, small boats, printing equipment, and transistorized public address systems. He also wishes to contract for the services of an American public relations firm to improve his image abroad and counteract Jagan’s propaganda in the foreign press. Since we believe that there is a good likelihood that Jagan can be elected in Guyana unless the entire non-East Indian electorate is mobilized against him, we also believe that campaign support must be provided to Peter D’Aguiar, the head of the United Force (UF) and Burnham’s coalition partner. See document for non-redacted parts of plan.                                                                                               

Honduras (Honduras 1984)
Declassified documents, from the CIA Inspector General, begin with a heavily redacted 21 July 1984 cable to the National Security Council, stating that Gen. Gustavo Alvarez Martinez, head of the Honduras military, ordered the establishment of the 316th Military Intelligence Battalion (316 MI Bn).
Honduras 1987
Florencio Caballero was a former Honduran Army sergeant and interrogator until 1984. He stated that he had trained by the Central Intelligence Agency, which the New York Times confirmed with US and Honduran officials. Much of his account was confirmed by three American and two Honduran officials. may be the fullest given of how army and police units were authorized to organize death squads that seized, interrogated and killed suspected leftists. He said that while Argentine and Chilean trainers taught the Honduran Army kidnapping and elimination techniques, the C.I.A. explicitly forbade the use of physical torture or assassination. Caballero described the CIA role as ambiguous. "Caballero said his superior officers ordered him and other members of army intelligence units to conceal their participation in death squads from CIA advisers. He added that he was sent to Houston for six months in 1979 to be trained by CIA instructors in interrogation techniques.
"They prepared me in interrogation to end the use of physical torture in Honduras - they taught psychological methods," Mr. Caballero said of his American training. "So when we had someone important, we hid him from the Americans, interrogated him ourselves and then gave him to a death squad to kill."
"The C.I.A. had access to secret army jails and to written reports summarizing the interrogation of suspected leftists, according to Mr. Caballero and two American officials. The Americans also said the C.I.A. knew the Honduran Army was killing prisoners. The American officials said that at one point in 1983 the C.I.A. demanded the killings stop. In 1984, a C.I.A. agent was recalled from Honduras after a prisoner's relative identified him as having visited a secret jail, two American and one Honduran official said. According to Mr. Caballero, the agent was a regular contact between the interrogators and the C.I.A. Thus it seems likely that the C.I.A. was aware that killings were continuing.                                                                                              Honduras 1995
In 1995, "The special prosecutor for human rights brought charges in July against eight retired and two active-duty members of the armed forces for their role in the kidnaping, torture, and attempted murder in 1982 of six student activists.... They survived their captivity in a clandestine prison because two of those abducted were the daughters of a government official....With the exception of one suspect, those under investigation were connected with Battalion 3-16, a secret Honduran military unit whose members were instructed by and worked with CIA officials...Although Human Rights Watch/Americas has pressed for several years for an accounting of U.S. involvement, the Clinton administration did not take steps to begin to examine the complicity of the United States in Honduran abuses until 1995. In mid-June, CIA Director John Deutch began an internal review of the agency's relationship with the Honduran military during the 1980s. Deutch stated that the investigation, which he characterized as an "independent review," would yield "new information" and "lessons about how not to do things while I'm director and in the future."
Deutch's announcement came after the Baltimore Sun published a four-part series in June on U.S. support given to the 316 MI Bn. Sun staff correspondents Gary Cohn and Ginger Thompson obtained formerly classified documents and interviewed three former 316 Bn members to document the breadth and depth of the battalion's close relationship to the CIA. The Sun series followed revelations in March that linked the CIA to serious human rights violations in Guatemala."
He was removed from his post at the end of March 1984. According to the cable, a Honduran human rights group claimed the battalion was responsible for almost all disappearances. At first, the new military leadership was going to dissolve the battalion, but they later decided to replace senior officers and keep it intact.
The CIA Inspector General investigator posed questions including whether any CIA employee was present during torture or hostile interrogation, and what was known about some disappearances and killings. It was also questioned if an employee lied to the House Intelligence Committee.
While the findings were heavily redacted, apparently one employee knew that torture had gone on, but not who was present. An individual was later identified, who denied participation. The Inspector General concluded there was no CIA participation in torture.
The IG did verify that a Honduran Hostage Rescue Force had captured and executed one individual who had been freed under an amnesty; it was unclear from the report if he had rejoined an insurgency. Another case concerned Father Carney, a priest who had renounced his American citizenship, and died under questionable circumstances while being pursued by the HRF. He had been reported to be "cadaverous" and may have died of starvation, or may have been killed by the HRF. The IG concluded no US personnel had been involved with this HRF operation.
Further Congressional inquiries generated more responses. It became clear that the HRF definitely executed some guerillas, including the aide to the priest. The details were redacted, but there was some, but not conclusive, evidence that Father Carney had starved. The IG concluded the cause of his death is unknown.

Nicaragua (Nicaragua 1981-1990)

The U.S argued that "The United States initially provided substantial economic assistance to the Sandinista-dominated regime. We were largely instrumental in the OAS action delegitimizing the Somoza regime and laying the groundwork for installation for the new junta. Later, when the Sandinista role in the Salvadoran conflict became clear, we sought through a combination of private diplomatic contacts and suspension of assistance to convince Nicaragua to halt its subversion. Later still, economic measures and further diplomatic efforts were employed to try to effect changes in Sandinista behavior. Nicaragua's neighbors have asked for assistance against Nicaraguan aggression, and the United States has responded. Those countries have repeatedly and publicly made clear that they consider themselves to be the victims of aggression from Nicaragua, and that they desire United States assistance in meeting both subversive attacks and the conventional threat posed by the relatively immense Nicaraguan Armed Forces." CIA had supported an exile group, the (Contra) revolution, which wanted to overthrow the democratically-elected Sandinista government of Nicaragua. Eventually, the Congress of the United States viewed Reagan Administration's anti-Sandinista policies with extreme skepticism. Their efforts resulted in passage in late 1982 of an amendment introduced by Representative Edward P. Boland to the Fiscal Year 1983 Defense Appropriations bill. This first of a series of Boland Amendments prohibited the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the principal conduit of covert American support to the contras, from spending any money "for the purpose of overthrowing the government of Nicaragua." Sale of arms to Iran in exchange for cash to be sent to Nicaranguan Contras was facilitated by Israel, in the CIA-approved operation underlying the Iran-Contra Affair. The majority report stated, " The Central Intelligence Agency was the U.S. Government agency that assisted the contras. In accordance with Presidential decisions, known as findings, and with funds appropriated by Congress, the C.I.A. armed, clothed, fed and supervised the contras. Despite this assistance, the contras failed to win widespread popular support of military victories within Nicaragua." After the Boland Amendments were passed, however, CIA no longer supported the Sandanistas. Reagan's posture towards the Sandinista government was highly controversial.
A number of actions were taken by National Security Council staff, actions that the Boland Amendments had forbidden to the CIA. While the CIA, as an organization, was not allowed to act in this manner, Director of Central Intelligence William Casey took part in White House/NSC discussions and actions to follow the Reagan policy.
The NSC staff's efforts to assist the contras in the wake of Congress's withdrawal of funding took many forms. Initially it meant extending its earlier initiative to increase third-country contributions to the contras. Casey and McFarlane broached the subject of such funding at a June 25, 1984, meeting of the National Security Planning Group (NSPG), consisting of the President, Vice President Bush, Casey, (National Security Advisor) Robert McFarlane, Secretary of State George Shultz, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, United Nations Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. John Vessey, and presidential adviser Edwin Meese III. Shultz warned that any approach to a third country could be viewed as an "impeachable offense," and convinced the group that it needed a legal opinion from Attorney General William French Smith. McFarlane agreed and told the group not to approach any foreign country until the opinion was delivered. McFarlane said nothing about what he already had obtained from the Saudis.
Questions arose as to the propriety of certain actions taken by the National Security Council staff and the manner in which the decision to transfer arms to Iran had been made. Congress was never informed. A variety of intermediaries, both private and governmental, some with motives open to question, had central roles. The N.S.C. staff rather than the C.I.A. seemed to be running the operation. The President appeared to be unaware of key elements of the operation. The controversy threatened a crisis of confidence in the manner in which national security decisions are made and the role played by the N.S.C. staff.
As a supplement to the normal N.S.C. process, the Reagan Administration adopted comprehensive procedures for covert actions. These are contained in a classified document, NSDD-159, establishing the process for deciding, implementing, monitoring, and reviewing covert activities.
After the Boland Amendment was enacted, it became illegal under U.S. law to fund the Contras; National Security Adviser Robert MacFarlane, Deputy National Security Adviser Admiral John Poindexter, National Security Council staffer Col. Oliver North and others continued an illegal operation to fund the Contras, leading to the Iran-Contra scandal. At that point, members of the National Security Council staff continued covert operations forbidden to the CIA.
Nicaragua 1985
"After bribing his way out of prison in Venezuela in September 1985, Luis Posada Carrilles went directly to El Salvador to work on the illicit contra resupply operations being run by Lt. Col. Oliver North. Posada assumed the name "Ramon Medina," and worked as a deputy to another anti-Castro Cuban exile, Felix Rodriguez, who was in charge of a small airlift of arms and supplies to the contras in Southern Nicaragua. Rodriguez used the code name, Max Gomez. ...Posada and Rodriguez obtaining supplies for contra troops from a warehouse at Illopango airbase in San Salvador."
Nicaragua 1987
The operation underlying the Iran-Contra Affair was given legal approval by then-CIA deputy counsel David Addington among others, according to Salon.com Washington bureau chief Sidney Blumenthal.
Nicaragua 1989
It is alleged that CIA smuggled cocaine from Nicaragua to the U.S. to finance the Contra war in Nicaragua.

South America (Regional issues)

1980
The landmark Filártiga v. Peña-Irala ruling of 1980 "made history by awarding the first criminal damages against a torturer (a Paraguayan police agent) found to be in the United States. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit established that, under the 1789 Aliens Tort Claims Act, U.S. courts have jurisdiction over claims for torture brought by aliens against torturers found to be in the United States." This decision opened up a new avenue for appeals of actions that took place outside the US.

1992
In 1992, Congress codified these legal advances in the Torture Victims Protection Act, which holds liable for damages any "individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation... subjects an individual to torture." During the decade between these important events, U.S. jurisprudence was largely shaped by Argentine cases.

National issues

Argentina
Intelligence and police issues need to be understood in the context of Argentina's political system. In the USA, the Executive Branch, and the Intelligence Community within it, are, at least in principle, subject to the oversight of Congress, and potentially to judicial review. There are barriers between intelligence and law enforcement, theoretically impervious in the case of the CIA and NSA, and carefully controlled with the FBI. Police are largely decentralized at the state and local level. While there will be differences, especially with a parliamentary system, most European countries, as well as Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, have a workable set of controls, with continuing improvement.
Argentina, however, historically has not had such controls.
Yet, in Argentina, the security and intelligence services remain today entirely exempt from this principle. In fact, there is no law regulating the powers or providing for accountability and control over the activities of the intelligence agencies. For Argentina, the consolidation of democracy is still the main political challenge in the twenty-first century. And within this overdue task, one of the most problematic issues is the control of the intelligence apparatus. It is problematic not only because of its historical relationship with the military dictatorship, but also because it is a complicated issue in the most well established democracies.
There still needs to be external control, but a basic internal control mechanism is
... the separation of the intelligence community into different agencies. Although this might reduce effectiveness, it eliminates the dangers of domination and monopoly by a single agency. The separation must be accompanied by a clear delimitation of responsibilities by each agency, trying not to overlap functions in a single one. A common way to do this is by diving the faculties and jurisdiction into external and internal conflicts.
This type of control is only beginning to evolve in Argentina, where
Argentina’s intelligence community today must be understood within an historical context that includes a recent experience with state terrorism, in which the military-intelligence forces were the principal practitioners of state terror. During the years of dictatorship, the main role of the Armed Forces in Argentina shifted form defending the country from external aggressions to defending it from its internal enemies.
With the return to democracy many steps were taken to dismantle the authoritarian legacy and the issue of the power and autonomy of the intelligence agencies came into public debate. The considerable autonomy it had from constitutional controls, either legislative or judicial, began to be questioned and gradually began to be reversed.
As soon as the civilian government assumed power, the members of the military Juntas were tried and convicted for the atrocities they committed during the years of dictatorship. However, lower ranks were granted immunity after the enactment by Congress of two laws: “Punto Final” (Final Point) and “Obediencia de Vida” (Justification Defense). Some other initiatives included the appointment of a civilian as head of the State Intelligence Agency and the functional delimitation of the different components of the intelligence community by the National Defense Law [Law No. 23.554, April 13, 1988] and the Internal Security Law [Law No. 24.059 , December 18, 1991.]
The intelligence agencies, moving forward, were not seen as effective or objective.
During the 1990’s Argentina experienced two of the biggest terrorist attacks in its history: the AMIA (Israeli Association) and the Israeli Embassy bombings, that left a total of more than one hundred people dead. Till today, the authors of the bombings are still unknown. The inefficiency of the intelligence services is seen as the principal reason of this institutional failure. In August 2000, the head of the State Intelligence Agency, Fernando de Santibañes, was accused of paying bribes to opposition senators in Congress in order to enact a labor law. The scandal created an institutional crisis within Argentina. The head of the agency and several senators resigned in the last month. Additionally, the vice president Carlos Alvarez also resigned as an act of protest because he believed that the Executive Branch was not actively condemning the episode. A Federal Judge is still investigating the case
The Argentine system is, in some respects, more decentralized, and, in other respects, more decentralized than the US intelligence community. There is no equivalent to the US Director of National Intelligence, but there is a National Intelligence Center (CNI) that has a coordinating rather than management role. CNI, in principle, is responsible for medium and long-term analysis, while the State Intelligence Secretary (SIDE) is responsible for short-term strategic intelligence.
SIDE went through major changes in January 2000. First, the civilian head of the agency, Fernando de Santibañes, fired over 1000 employees. Many of the discharged agents were related to the military dictatorship of the seventies, with histories of extortion, kidnapping, torture, disappearances and assassinations. A new set of priorities were established: rather than focus on a threat ofinternal and external subversion, the new focus is on "illicit trafficking, corruption, white-collar crime, terrorism, money la undering, organized crime, and the formulation of strategic policies in different areas for the President." In the Argentine context, "security forces" are intermediate forces between police forces (provincial and federal) and the armed forces. They are coordinated, rather than commanded, by the National Direction of Internal Intelligence, located in the Interior Ministry. Still, they are national organizations, without decentralized police: the Naval Prefecture, National Gendarmerie, Federal Police Force, and Local Police Forces.                                                                                                                                                                                   Argentina 1965
CIA trains police and military of Argentina.                                                                                                                                               Argentina 1975
A military junta took control, and suspended the constitution, dissolved Congress, imposed strict censorship, and banned all political parties. In addition, it embarked on a campaign of terror against leftist elements in the country. Thousands of leftist opposition supporters were persecuted, illegally imprisoned, tortured and executed without trial. Many of them disappeared and were never again seen by their families. The military dictatorship lasted until 1983, when democratic elections designed Raul Alfonsín (UCR) as President of the country. The 1975-1983 period was the one most vulnerable to excesses, which may have involved foreign forces.                                                                                                                                                     Argentina 1976
Human Rights Watch observed,
Until the 1976 coup, and for months afterwards, the United States relied to a large extent on the armed forces as its main interlocutors in Argentina's turbulent politics. Unlike in Chile and Uruguay, where the U.S had backed reformist parties (at least until the emergence of a serious left-wing challenge in the early 1970s), it was consistently hostile to the most popular political movement in Argentina, Peronism. In the face of Peron's populist rhetoric, economic nationalism, and fascist sympathies, the military seemed to provide a moderate alternative, favorable to American investment, and just as staunchly anti-communist.                                                                                                                                              Argentina 1977
According to Wikipedia, the Argentine military workrf with CIA in Operation Charly, in a program lasting until 1983. According to the Wikipedia article on Operation Charly, while the invasion of the Falkland Islands and the subsequent return to civilian rule in 1983 put an end to Argentine operations in Central America, the "dirty war" continued well into the 1990s, with hundreds of thousands being "disappeared." The Reagan administration took over the covert operations.
The U.S. did not explicitly denounce the systematic nature of the abuses until the beginning of the Carter Administration in January 1977.
Argentina 1978
"In September 1978, after Vice-President Walter Mondale met Videla in Rome, U.S. Ambassador Raul Castro reported that "General Viola received me smiling broadly and immediately volunteered the observation that he believed the Rome meeting had gone very well... Viola clearly indicated he had received some positive signals from the USG [U.S. government] referring to the release of FMS [Foreign Military Sales] purchases.""
Argentina 1979
"A 1979 telegram reveals how U.S. policy placed U.S. officials in a moral and political predicament while dealing with those responsible for human rights atrocities. At a meeting with General Viola, then-U.S. Ambassador Raul Castro asked him to help clarify the fate of two recent disappeared Montonero insurgents, Mendizabal and Croatto. Viola responded without hesitation, "Mendizabal and Croatto were terrorists ... who were eliminated ... with my authorization."
Argentina 1981
HRW said that the climate for human rights changed radically with the election of President Ronald Reagan. In February 1981, the Administration ordered representatives to "international financial institutions to stop opposing loans on human rights grounds to Argentina and other Southern Cone countries. It began a long certification battle in Congress to resume military sales, loans, and training programs to Argentina, arguing that human rights conditions had dramatically improved. It was true that "disappearances" had declined, but more than a thousand political prisoners were still being held without charges, and temporary "disappearances," arbitrary arrests, and torture continued."
Argentina 1983
In June 1983, the NGO Americas Watch visited Honduras and stated in its report that "The General Gustavo Alvarez Martínez, head of the Hondurian military staff, has publicly defended the use of the Argentine method to confront the subversive threat in Latin America. As a matter of fact, Alvarez is responsible of having brought to Honduras the first Argentine military instructors, when he was commandant of the Fuerza de Seguridad Pública (Fusep [Public Security Force]).
Argentina 1987
In the landmark case of Forti v. Suárez Mason (1987),, the Court held that torturers were hostis humani generis and thus subject to the jurisdiction of any country, even though the acts had not taken place in that country, and the parties were not citizens of that country.
Further, a commander could be held liable for tortures performed by subordinates, as in the doctrine of command responsibility. "The defendant in all but one of the cases was Gen. Carlos Guillermo Suárez Mason, whose clandestine presence in the U.S after fleeing prosecution in Argentina triggered lawsuits from several of his victims. As commander of the First Army Corps, Suárez Mason participated in the preparation of the 1976 coup, oversaw the operations of task forces, and was ultimately responsible for secret detention camps in the densely populated region comprising Buenos Aires and its suburbs, La Plata, Mar del Plata, and smaller cities." Martínez Baca v. Suárez Mason (1988) used the Filartiga precedent                                                        Argentina 1989
In Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic (1989), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in favor of a ship that had been attacked by Argentine aircraft during the Falklands War. While this was not an explicit human rights case, it added to the body of law of jurisdiction over extraterritorial events.
Ouiros de Rapaport v. Suárez Mason, (1989), followed in the steps of Filartiga.                                                   Argentina, date uncertain
"The other face of U.S. policy toward Argentina at this time was shown by the sympathetic treatment Suárez Mason received from certain U.S. authorites. ...Oliver North", a National Security Council staff member who often acted independently of the CIA, although he arranged orders to be given to the agency, was :reported to have arranged a false visa for Suárez to enter the United States. North had reportedly been discussing with him the possible establishment of a pan-american counterinsurgency force, a proposal that emerged out of ongoing cooperation between the CIA and the Argentine military, in which Suárez Mason was an important actor.

Argentina 1992
Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina (1992) again used the precedent in Filartiga.

Bolivia
The 5412 Special Group and the 303 Committee were different names for the same committee, which approved covert actions.

Bolivia 1964
On 8 August 1963, the Special Group approved a request to provide a covert subsidy in the amount of to take the necessary covert actions to overcome the emergency situation which existed in Bolivia at that time and, once the situation normalized, to enable Paz to consolidate his control. In late December, the United States Ambassador and the CIA requested an additional sum of [deleted] to wrest control of labor organizations away from Juan Lechin Oquendo, the MNRI, and the PCB. On 8 January 1964, the CIA [deleted] discussed the request for additional funds with Assistant Secretary Edwin W. Martin [for Inter-American Affairs] and it was mutually agreed that an increase in the subsidy was justified. A discussion of this plan is contained in a January 9 memorandum prepared by J.C. King, Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division in CIA (DDP) The United States Ambassador was informed that Special Group approval would be requested at the earliest possible date.
Bolivia 1965
According to a 303 Committee memo, "Barrientos, due to his popularity and power position, appears to have the best chance for organizing behind him a national consensus which would provide the needed unity to proceed with the development of Bolivia. this sum of money will expedite and help other negotiations currently being undertaken by the Embassy and the AID program. Barrientos has requested U.S. Government help in his election campaign. The Embassy in La Paz, the Department of State, and the CIA all concur that in the present circumstances the best possibility for stability in Bolivia is the ascendency to the Presidency of Barrientos with a return to constitutionality." The 303 Committee approved the recommendation by a vote by telephone on February 5. According to a February 10 memorandum [text not declassified] to ARA, Barrientos was informed on that date of the decision and of the U.S. Government view "that relations between sovereigns should be based upon dignity and mutual respect rather than financial considerations; but in order to dispel any doubts" in Barrientos’ mind "of our attitude toward him, his request was approved as a one-shot affair. It is proposed to provide in appropriate stages the total sum of CIA supplies USD 1,000,000 to support election of President René Barrientos

Bolivia 1967
In a July 5, 1967, memorandum to Special Assistant Walt Rostow, William Bowdler of the National Security Council Staff summarized the current U.S. military training role in Bolivia: "DOD is helping train and equip a new Ranger Battalion. The Bolivian absorption capacity being what it is, additional military assistance would not now seem advisable." Bowdler recommended that "a variable of the Special Strike Force acceptable to the Country Team be established. It might be part of the new Ranger Battalion." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, Guerrilla Problem in Latin America) The Country Team objections were transmitted in telegram 2291 from La Paz, May 24. The team stated that a strike force would be viewed by the Bolivians as a "magical solution" and a "substitute for hard work and needed reform." "As the training of the Ranger battalion progressed, weaknesses in its intelligence-collecting capability emerged. The CIA was formally given responsibility for developing a plan to provide such a capability on July 14...Although the team was assigned in an advisory capacity, CIA "expected that they will actually help in directing operations." The Agency also contemplated this plan "as a pilot program for probable duplication in other Latin American countries faced with the problem of guerrilla warfare." (Memorandum for the Acting Chief, Western Hemisphere Division)"
Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms reported, to State, Defense, and White House Officials in a memo drafted by W.V. Broe and in the Western Hemisphere Division and approved by Thomas H. Karamessines, Deputy Director for Plans.
"1. You are aware of the published accounts concerning the death of Ernesto "Che" Guevara which were based in essence on the Bolivian Army press conference on 10 October attributing Guevara’s death to battle wounds sustained in the clash between the Army and the guerrillas on 8 October 1967.On October 9 Rostow informed President Johnson the "tentative information" that the Bolivian unit trained by the U.S. "got Che Guevara," but that information was inconclusive and based primarily on press reports from Bolivia. Guevara was said to be in a coma when captured and to have died shortly thereafter, the heat of battle having prevented early or effective treatment by Bolivian soldiers.
"2. [deleted] contrary information from probably Felix Rodriguez the Bolivian Second Ranger Battalion, the army unit that captured Guevara. According to [deleted] Guevara was captured on 8 October as a result of the clash with the Cuban-led guerrillas. He had a wound in his leg, but was otherwise in fair condition. According to the text of a message sent by on the scene, Guevara’s fate would be decided on October 9 by the highest Bolivian military authorities. "I am managing to keep him alive," he reported, "which is very hard." He was questioned but refused to give any information. Two Bolivian guerrillas, "Willy" and "Aniceto," were also captured.
"3. At 1150 hours on 9 October the Second Ranger Battalion received direct orders from Bolivian Army Headquarters in La Paz to kill Guevara. These orders were carried out at 1315 hours the same day with a burst of fire from an M-2 automatic rifle.In an October 11 memorandum informing President Johnson of the killing of Che Guevara, Rostow remarked: "I regard this as stupid, but it is understandable from a Bolivian standpoint, given the problems which the sparing of French Communist and Castro courier Regis Debray has caused them." Rostow pointed out that the death of Che Guevara would have a strong impact in discouraging further guerrilla activity in Latin America. He also noted: "It shows the soundness of our ‘preventive medicine’ assistance to countries facing incipient insurgency-it was the Bolivian 2nd Ranger Battalion, trained by our Green Berets from June-September of this year, that cornered and got him." On October 13 Rostow informed Johnson of confirmation that Che Guevara was dead.
Copies of this memorandum in CIA files indicate that it was drafted by Broe and [deleted] in the Western Hemisphere Division and approved by Karamessines. (Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/IMS, Operational Group, Job 78-06423A, U.S. Government-President)[deleted] was an eye witness to Guevara’s capture and execution.
Felix Rodriguez, a CIA officer on the team, with the Bolivian Army that captured and shot Guevara. Che Guevara by the Bolivian Army in October 1967 Rodriquez said that after he received a Bolivian presidential execution order, he told "the soldier who pulled the trigger to aim carefully, to remain consistent with the Bolivian government's story that Che had been killed in action during a clash with the Bolivian army." Rodriguez said the US government had wanted Che in Panama, and "I could have tried to falsify the command to the troops, and got Che to Panama as the US government said they had wanted," said Mr Rodriguez.
He chose to "let history run its course" as desired by Bolivia. In a supplementary memo drafted by Broe and [deleted], approved by Karamessines, and signed by Helms, Guevara refused to be interrogated but permitted himself to be drawn into a conversation with [deleted] during which he made the following comments:
a. Cuban economic situation: Hunger in Cuba is the result of pressure by United States imperialism. Now Cuba has become self-sufficient in meat production and has almost reached the point where it will begin to export meat. Cuba is the only economically self-sufficient country in the Socialist world.
b. Camilo Cienfuegos: For many years the story has circulated that Fidel Castro Ruz had Cienfuegos, one of his foremost deputies, killed because his personal popularity presented a danger to Castro. Actually the death of Cienfuegos was an accident. Cienfuegos has been in Oriente Province when he received a call to attend a general staff meeting in Havana. He left by plane and the theory was that the plane became lost in low-ceiling flying conditions, consumed all of its fuel, and crashed in the ocean, and no trace of him was ever found. Castro had loved Cienfuegos more than any of his lieutenants.
c. Fidel Castro Ruz: Castro had not been a Communist prior to the success of the Cuban Revolution. Castro’s own statements on the subject are correct.
d. The Congo: American imperialism had not been the reason for his failure there but, rather, the Belgian mercenaries. He denied ever having several thousand troops in the Congo, as sometimes reported, but admitted having had "quite a few".
e. Treatment of Guerrilla Prisoners in Cuba: During the course of the Cuban Revolution and its aftermath, there had been only about 1,500 individuals killed, exclusive of armed encounters such as the Bay of Pigs. The Cuban Government, of course, executed all guerrilla leaders who invaded its territory. . . . (He stopped then with a quizzical look on his face and smiled as he recognized his own position on Bolivian soil.)
f. Future of the Guerrilla Movement in Bolivia: With his capture, the guerrilla movement had suffered an overwhelming setback in Bolivia, but he predicted a resurgence in the future. He insisted that his ideals would win in the end even though he was disappointed at the lack of response from the Bolivian campesinos. The guerrilla movement had failed partially because of Bolivian Government propaganda which claimed that the guerrillas represented a foreign invasion of Bolivian soil. In spite of the lack of popular response from the Bolivian campesinos, he had not planned an exfiltration route from Bolivia in case of failure. He had definitely decided to either fall or win in this effort.
4. According to [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] when Guevara, Simon Cuba, and Aniceto Reynaga Gordillo were captured on 8 October, the Bolivian Armed Forces Headquarters ordered that they be kept alive for a time. A telegraphic code was arranged between La Paz and Higueras with the numbers 500 representing Guevara, 600 meaning the phrase "keep alive" and 700 representing "execute". During the course of the discussion with Guevara, Simon Cuba and Aniceto Reynaga were detained in the next room of the school house. At one stage, a burst of shots was heard and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] learned later that Simon Cuba had been executed. A little later a single shot was heard and it was learned afterward that Aniceto Reynaga had been killed. When the order came at 11:50 a.m. from La Paz to kill Guevara, the execution was delayed as long as possible. However, when the local commander was advised that a helicopter would arrive to recover the bodies at approximately 1:30 p.m., Guevara was executed with a burst of shots at 1:15 p.m. Guevara’s last words were, "Tell my wife to remarry and tell Fidel Castro that the Revolution will again rise in the Americas." To his executioner he said, "Remember, you are killing a man."
The on site, reporting on Guevara’s execution, indicated that "it was impossible keep him alive."
5. At no time during the period he was under [deleted] observation did Guevara lose his composure.
A National Intelligence Estimate of September 14 stated: "The present insurgency in Bolivia is organized and supported by Cuba. Its seriousness lies in the possibility that the insurgents may eventually provide a rallying point for many disaffected elements which hitherto have been unable to coalesce. The threat posed is more a function of the inherent fragility of Bolivia’s political, economic, and social structure than of the insurgents’ own strength and capabilities.
"Over the next year or so, there is little chance that the insurgents will be able to bring about the overthrow of the Barrientos regime, but it is also unlikely that the regime will be able to stamp out the insurgency.
"A prolongation and expansion of the insurgency would impose severe financial and psychological strains on Bolivia, greatly hindering the economic development and social amelioration that are essential to the achievement of stability in that country. Defense costs for a protracted guerrilla war would add heavily to the already serious deficit in the national budget, would further limit public investment, and would threaten the government’s stabilization program. In these circumstances, Barrientos would become increasingly dependent on US aid. Although eager to obtain technical and material military aid, he would be extremely reluctant to sanction a military intervention in force by the already concerned neighboring states or by the OAS.
Further commentary on the CIA's involvement in Che Guevara's execution by the Bolivian Army in October 1967, attributed to Bolivian Minister of Interior Antonio Arguedas Mendieta, is available in an article by Gregorio Selser.

Brazil

Brazil 1965
The Office of Public Safety of the US Agency for International Development trains Brazilian police.
The CIA is suspected to have known the whereabouts of various Nazi scientists who were believed to have been involved in toxin research for the CIA.

Chile

Chile 1964
CIA spreads disinformation that Salvador Allende, the Socialist candidate, was receiving funds from Eastern Bloc nations or Cuba. The Christian Democrat Party of Chile candidate Eduardo Frei Montalva wins the election.

Chile 1970
On September 4, 1970 Salvador Allende gained presidency of Chile after four elections and became the first socialist to be democratically elected in the Western Hemisphere in the 20th century. Soon after, President Richard Nixon ordered a covert operation, Project FUBELT, to undermine Allende's government and promote a military coup in Chile. The operations included Henry Kissinger (National Security Advisor), Richard Helms (CIA Director), and Attorney General John N. Mitchell. Under the supervision of Thomas Karamessines, a special task force was established and led by veteran David Atlee Phillips. $10,000,000 is authorized; $8,000,000 is spent.

Chile 1973
On September 11, 1973 General Augusto Pinochet, who had just 19 days prior become the commander in chief of the army, executed a coup d'etat which resulted in the death of Allende and the beginning of Pinochet's dictatorship, during which opposition was suppressed via state terrorism. Whether the US directly participated in the coup itself is disputed, see 1973 Chilean coup d'état.

To be continued.........

Colombia .....

Ecuador ...

Peru .........

Venezuela ..........

 

 

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Created by:	Salauddine Mohammed Faruque on July 25,2007, last updated on 25.03.2008